Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

The State of Utah v. Craig Veale : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christine F Soltis; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee .
Robert L. Donohoe; Attorney For Appellant .
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, The State of Utah v. Craig Veale, No. 20100049 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2137

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

])
)

vs.
Craig Veale,

Case No. 20100049-CA
. Appeal

]

1 )eiendanl. Appchanu

]

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
HONORABLE ANTHONY QUINN PRESIDING

ROBERT L. DONOHOE
8 East Broadway, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-5225
Facsimile: (801) 521-5268
Attorney for Appellant
Christine F. Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

AUG 2 5 2011
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20100049-CA

vs.

Appeal

Craig Veale,
Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
HONORABLE ANTHONY QUINN PRESIDING

ROBERT L. DONOHOE
8 East Broadway, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-5225
Facsimile: (801) 521-5268
Attorney for Appellant
Christine F. Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

ARGUMENT

1

L

II.

APPELLANT HAS MET THE MARSHALING
REQUIREMENT REGARDGING EACH OF HIS
CLAIMS

1

A. Sufficiency of the evidence

1

B. Ineffective assistance of counsel

6

APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENCY OF
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON
THE MERITS

9

A. Appellant preserved his claim there is insufficient
evidence to support his manslaughter conviction ...

10

B. The preservation doctrine should not apply to a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim

10

C. Even if Appellant failed to preserve his insufficiency
claim and this court finds the preservation doctrine
applies to Appellant's claim, it was plain error for the
trial court to submit the case to the jury on anything
other than a charge of negligent homicide
12
CONCLUSION

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985)

5

State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346 (Utah 2000)

10-13

State v. Robinson, 63 P.3d 105 (Utah App. 2003)

3

State v. Rudolph, 3 P.3d 192 (Utah App. 2000)

11

State v. Workman, 122 P.3d 639 (Utah 2005)

4

United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mt. Fonds,
140 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2006)

1,4,
6, 7, 9

Statutes and Rules:
Utah Code Ann. 76-2-103(3)

4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT HAS MET THE MARSHALLING
REQUIREMENT REGARDING EACH OF HIS CLAIMS.

A. Sufficiency of the evidence.
Appellant has presented the evidence in a light most favorable to the
verdict, in accordance with the long-standing rules of this court. See United
Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 140P.3d
1200 (Utah 2006). In doing so, Appellant has done more than merely
"provide an exhaustive review of all the evidence presented at trial/' per the
requirements enumerated in Park City Mines. Id. at 1207 (citation omitted).
Appellant has also "demonstrate[d] how the court found the facts from the
evidence and then explained] why those findings contradict the clear weight
of the evidence." Id.
Appellant begins his opening brief with an exhaustive statement of the
facts presented at trial, including all facts supporting the findings of the jury.
(Appellant's Brief, 3-19.) Appellant also reviews these facts in a light most
favorable to the jury verdict. (Appellant's Brief, 3-24.)
Without eviscerating his argument, Appellant now recalls for this
Court his marshaling of some particularly damning facts against him. For
instance, and without reciting all the facts in Appellant's Brief, Appellant
acknowledges that, although he didn't remember having his finger on the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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trigger when the shotgun fired, "I must have [had my finger on the trigger.]"
(Appellant's Brief, 6-7.) Appellant also acknowledges Detective Coleman's
testimony as to what Appellant told the detective in the aftermath of the
shooting. Appellant and the victim were arguing: "[A]t that point
[Appellant] describes stepping back and picking up the gun. ... [T]hat's
when he pulled the trigger." (Appellant's Brief, 8.) Appellant also notes
Detective Coleman's quotation of Appellant on the night of the shooting: "I
think I just pulled her around. And she, what do you gotta do? It was just
like that and bam, it was over." (Appellant's Brief, 8). Appellant points out
in his brief that he agreed with the prosecutor's assertion that he knew the
danger his shotgun presented, that he pointed the gun toward the bathroom
where he knew the victim to be, and that he "wasn't paying attention" to the
victim. (Appellant's Brief, 9.) Appellant also acknowledges in his brief
Detective Coleman's testimony that Appellant was telling a different version
of events at trial than he had when interviewed by Detective Coleman in the
immediate aftermath of the shooting. (Appellant's Brief, 9). Appellant also
acknowledges he told a 9-1-1 dispatcher he "just killed [his] girlfriend," that
he "shot her with a shotgun," and that he "can't even believe how [he] pulled
the trigger." (Appellant's Brief, 10.) Appellant reminds this Court that he
admitted to Officer McCarthy, "I can't believe I killed [the victim] ... I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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killed her." (Appellant's Brief, 13.) Appellant also acknowledges Detective
Coleman's testimony that Appellant told him Appellant "could not justify
his actions and what he had done." (Appellant's Brief, 17.) And although
Appellant seeks to classify the shooting as "drunken stupidity," he also
acknowledges that various police officers, and even his long-time friend who
knew him well, all testified that he did not seem to be intoxicated when they
spoke to him or otherwise observed his behavior. (Appellant's Brief, 15-18.)
Finally, Appellant's marshaling of the facts unfavorable to his argument
includes the acknowledgement his shotgun was tested sometime after the
shooting, and that it could not be made to fire without pulling the trigger,
and did not seem to have what Detective Coleman would call a "hair
trigger." (Appellant's Brief, 19.)
Appellant then contrasts those facts with the findings from a similar
case, State v. Robinson, 63 P.3d 105 (Utah App. 2003), although noting for
this Court that the facts in Robinson were "admittedly less well developed
than in Appellant's trial." (Appellant's Brief, 23.) Appellant also
acknowledges in his brief to this Court that "Detective Coleman believed
Appellant was saying 'he fired the gun intentionally.' " And, Appellant
marshals a number of facts contrary to his argument: that he had loaded a
shell into the gun earlier in the evening, before that victim came home, that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he was arguing with the victim at the time of the shooting, and that he was
angry when the gun fired. (Appellant's brief, 26-27.)
After his exhaustive marshaling of the evidence against him,
Appellant then explains why the jury's verdict contradicts the clear weight
of this evidence. See Park City Mines, at 1207. Without completely
restating his argument, Appellant now notes he argued the evidence against
him was insufficient to support the jury's verdict because the evidence did
not support a Finding that Appellant acted recklessly on the night of the
shooting.
Appellant begins by acknowledging the difficulties in such an appeal:
"We will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence only if we
determine that 'reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict'." State
v. Workman, 122 P.3d 639, 645 (Utah 2005) (citations omitted). Appellant
then notes:
A person acts recklessly "when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint."
Appellant's Brief at 22 (citing Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-103(3) (1999)).
Appellant points out he had been drinking beer all day leading up to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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shooting, that he had chambered a shell earlier in the day while
contemplating suicide, that when the victim came home he had forgotten he
had chambered a round, and, when the gun fired, he was trying to be sure the
gun was safe by checking the chamber. Appellant reminds this Court he
testified he did not remember consciously pulling the trigger, and that he
was not aiming the gun, nor trying to fire the gun when it did fire. Appellant
also reminds this Court he told the 9-1-1 dispatcher, Officer McCarthy and
Detective Coleman the shooting was unintentional, an accident. Appellant
points out his extreme distress over this accident, and that he feels
responsible for causing the death of the victim. But Appellant argues his
responsibility is limited to his negligence, that he should have been aware of
the risk he was taking, not that he actually was aware of the risk. Appellant
argues that because he was too drunk to appreciate the risk he was taking
when handling the shotgun in the presence of the victim, he could not
consciously disregard that risk.1
Appellant concludes reasonable minds simply could not have reached
a verdict of manslaughter. (Appellant's Brief, 21-29.)
1

As the State points out in its brief, the degree of intoxication is but one of
many factors a court may consider in determining whether a defendant was
reckless or criminally negligent. Here, it is the critical factor which explains
Appellant's lack of awareness of the risks he was taking. See Brief of
Appellee at 30, citing State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 262 (Utah 1985).
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Finally, it is worth noting that even in the dire circumstances where an
appellant has failed to meet the marshaling requirement, this Court is not
precluded from addressing the merits of Appellant's claims. A failure to
marshal evidence may be relied on in such draconian manner, but it is not
required. See, Park City Mines, at 1207. The procedural posture of this case
makes it one in which this Court will want to address on the merits of
Appellant's claims. Appellant was convicted at trial in June of 2003.
Appellant has sought an appeal ever since, eventually filing pro se in "
January, 2009, a document he called a Petition for Review. This Court
treated that filing as a Petition for Extraordinary Writ. When that Petition
was denied, Appellant eventually obtained and prevailed at a Manning
hearing in December, 2009. Timely notice was filed more than six-and-onehalf years after his conviction, and this appeal ensued. Appellant now awaits
a hearing of the issues he has raised on appeal.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
Likewise, in regards to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Appellant has complied with the marshaling required of him by presenting
the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. See Park City Mines.
And, Appellant has done more than merely "provide an exhaustive review of
all the evidence presented at trial." Id. Appellant has also "demonstrate^]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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how the court found the facts from the evidence and then explained] why
those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Id.
As previously noted, Appellant begins his opening brief with an
exhaustive statement of the facts presented at trial, including all facts
supporting the findings of the jury. (Appellant's Brief, 3-19.) Appellant also
reviews these facts in evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict.
(Appellant's Brief, 3-19 and 30-35.)
Among the facts marshaled by Appellant is the exclamation, "I just
blew her face right off!" (Appellant's Brief, 10.) He also acknowledges the
testimony of the medical examiner, who estimated the shotgun when fired
was in front of the victim and off to the victim's right, and that the muzzle of
the shotgun was within three or four feet of the victim at the time of the
shooting. (Appellant's Brief, 19.) Appellant also notes the gruesome details
of the medical examiner's testimony, what she described to the jury as
"exploding or blowout injuries of the face. ... Almost all the bone of her
lower jaw was missing. The tongue was missing, a lot of its tissue and the
muscles that are under the jaw. A lot of that tissue was absent." (Appellant's
Brief, 32-33.)
The State speculates "a legitimate reason is evident in the record" for
trial counsel's inexplicable decision not to object to the gruesome testimony
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the medical examiner. (Appellant's Brief, 35-36.) The State believes trial
counsel must have been so eager to exclude from evidence the gruesome
photos of the victim that he was willing to allow the testimony excerpted
above. But while trial counsel noted the information in the photos could be
adduced by other testimony, he failed to add that he surely meant that
testimony should be limited to other "relevant" information. Because, in the
very next sentence in his motion, trial counsel also notes, "none of the
information contained in the photos is disputed by the defendant." See
Addendum C to Appellee's Brief (Motion and Memorandum).
This is the crux of Appellant's argument that trial counsel was
ineffective. Because he successfully precluded admission of the gruesome
photos of the victim, it was ineffective not to also object to medical
examiner testimony that was not relevant to the issue of intent. That
Appellant caused the victim's death by shotgun blast was not at issue.
Appellant freely admitted, to anyone who asked, that he shot the victim. He
admitted it to the investigating officers, the prosecutor, and the jury. The
medical examiner was properly able to testify about the relative positions of
the victim and Appellant, and the proximity of the muzzle of the gun - three
or four feet - to the victim. These allowed the jury to assess intent without
the additional inflammatory information regarding the horrific nature of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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victim's wounds. That testimony could only serve to inflame the jury,
producing in the jury a sense of horror which could only provoke the jury's
instinct to punish. Not to object to the testimony of the medical examiner
regarding the gruesome details of the victim's wounds, and to the use of the
mannequin head as a prop, was not a reasonable defense strategy; as such, it
was ineffective assistance. See, Appellant's Brief, 30-35.
Finally, as more fully explained above, even if the marshaling
requirement is not met, this court is not precluded from addressing the merits
of an appellant's claims. See, Park City Mines. The procedural posture of
this case makes it one in which justice demands this Court address, on the
merits, Appellant's claims.
II.

APPELLANT'S CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON THE MERITS.
During closing argument, Appellant preserved his claim that the

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction by making it clear to the
Court the evidence supported a charge of criminal homicide. However, there
was no need for Appellant to preserve his claim that the evidence did not
support the jury verdict because the policy reasons supporting the
preservation doctrine are not present with a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
claim. Finally, the trial court committed plain error in submitting this case to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the jury, because the evidence in this case is insufficient to support
Appellant's conviction, and the insufficiency was so obvious and
fundamental the trial court should have allowed the jury to consider only a
charge of negligent homicide.
A. Appellant preserved his claim there is insufficient evidence to
support his manslaughter conviction.
During his closing argument, counsel for Appellant made clear to the
court, and the jury, his argument that the evidence was insufficient to
support anything other than the crime of negligent homicide. (Trial
transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 107-109.) u[B]ecause of what I think the evidence
shows is his criminal negligence in this case ... what we have here is a
criminal negligent homicide causing the death of [the victim] by my client
while he was acting in such a way that he ought to have been aware that he
was putting her at substantial risk, unjustifiable risk." (Trial transcript, Vol.
2, pp. 108-109.) This argument preserved Appellant's claim that the
evidence was insufficient.
B. The preservation doctrine should not apply to a sufficiency-of-the
evidence claim.
Contrary to the reasoning in State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346 (Utah
2000), "[neither] of the ... policy reasons supporting the preservation
doctrine is present with a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim." State v.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Rudolph, 3 P.3d 192, 194 (Utah App. 2000). The preservation doctrine is
designed to allow the trial court to address, and, if necessary, correct a
claimed error. It is also designed to prevent parties from foregoing
objections at trial as part of a strategy to enhance chances of acquittal, and
failing acquittal, then asking an appellate court to reverse on the basis of the
not-objected-to error. Id. As the Rudolph court notes, once a "jury renders a
verdict, as a practical matter there is little, if anything, relative to the
sufficiency of the evidence that can be corrected.'" Id. Further, because the
standard of review on a post-trial motion regarding the adequacy of the
evidence is the same as the standard of review applied by the appellate court,
"nothing is lost by waiting until the appeal stage to challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence." Id. at 195. Waiting until an appeal to review insufficiency
claims also has the advantage of not further burdening trial courts by
exhausting the limited time and resources of trial courts." Id. Thus,
"[ajlthough it is neither uncommon nor inappropriate to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a post-trial motion, such a
challenge should not be a prerequisite to challenge the same on appeal." Id.
atl96. 2
2

Randolph was decided four months prior to Holgate, and its finding
that the preservation rule does not apply to insufficiency claims is not
addressed by Digitized
the Holgate
court.
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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C. Even if Appellant failed to preserve his insufficiency claim and
this court finds the preservation doctrine applies to Appellant's
claim, it was plain error for the trial court to submit the case to
the jury on anything other than a charge of negligent homicide.
Finally, it was plain error for the trial court to submit the case to the
jury on anything other than a charge of criminal homicide, because to do so,
the trial court to had to ignore the obvious and fundamental lack of evidence
showing anything other than negligent behavior on the part of the Appellant.
"The plain error exception [to the preservation doctrine] enables the
appellate court to 'balance the need for procedural regularity with the
demands of fairness/ " State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000)
(citation omitted) (wherein, the court found that the sufficiency of the
evidence could be reviewed for plain error).
"At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit [the appellate
court] to avoid injustice." Id. (Citation omitted.) "To demonstrate plain
error, a defendant must establish that '(0 [a]n error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the
verdict is undermined." Id. (Citation omitted.) Appellant notes here that the
conspicuous lack of evidence of recklessness was an error which should
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have been obvious to the court, and absent that error (i.e., absent submission
of the murder and manslaughter instructions to the jury), Appellant would
have obtained the more favorable outcome of conviction of negligent
homicide. Thus, it was plain error to submit the case to the jury on anything
other than the negligent homicide instruction.
This Court should conclude "the evidence was insufficient when, after
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he ...
was convicted.' " Holgate, at 352. If this Court concludes the evidence is
insufficient, it "must then ... determine whether the evidentiary defect was
so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case to the
jury." Id.
Appellant's argument regarding the inconclusiveness of the evidence
supporting a finding of recklessness, and why the evidentiary defects should
have been obvious to the trial court is fully explained in his opening brief. A
few salient points bear repeating: First, whether it seemed like it or not,
Appellant was extremely intoxicated at the time of the shooting. His blood
alcohol level could have been as high as .21 at the time of the shooting, three
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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times the presumptive limit for legally operating an automobile, and making
it unlikely he could be aware of the risks he was taking with the gun.
Second, Appellant called the shooting an accident, and never backed down
from that stance, even though he emotionally took responsibility for the
damage his negligence had wrought. And third, Appellant was highly
distraught and remorseful after he had accidentally killed the victim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Appellant respectfully asks this Court to
reverse the jury's finding the Appellant was guilty of manslaughter.
DATED this 25th day of August, 2011.

Robert L. Donohoe
Attorney for Appellant
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